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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Thi£ is an appeal from a final judgment and decree 
of divorce and from an order on plaintiff's motion to clarify 
findings of fact and defendant's motion for court to 
reevaluate assets. Said decree and ord^r were made by the 
Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde/ one of the Judges of the Second 
Judicial District Court/ Weber County/ State of Utah. 
Jurisdiction is based on Rules 3 and 4 of the Rules of the 
Utah Court of Appeals and Title 78-2a-3^2)(g) , Utah Code 
Annotated. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the District Court abased its discretion in 
the valuation and distribution of marital assets by (1) 
failing to establish the valuation of tHe marital residence 
on the basis of an offer to purchase ma<$e by the appellant; 
(2) failing to take account of the early withdrawal penalty 
and tax consequences of such withdrawal in valuing the 
appellant's Kiraft thrift plan; and (3) failing to make 
adequate findings of fact to support hi$ final order of 
valuation and distribution. 
Whether appellant's appeal is frivolous/ justifying 
the award of attorney's fees to respondent. 
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DETERMINATIVE RULES 
See Rule 52(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure/ 
Exhibit A of addendum. 
See Rule 33/ Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals/ 
Exhibit B of addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal by defendant/ Robert Eugene 
Ellison/ from a judgment and decree of divorce and from a 
final order on cross motions for clarification by plaintiff 
and for reevaluation of assets by defendant/ wherein 
defendant claims that the Court committed error in the 
valuation of two assets: the family home and the Kraft thrift 
plan. 
2. Course of the Proceedings. 
The case was tried before the Honorable Ronald 0. 
Hyde/ one of the Judges of the Second Judicial District 
Court, Weber County, Utah/ on February 23/ 24 and 25, 1987. 
At the conclusion of the trial, the Judge ruled from the 
bench regarding custody of three children, child support, and 
visitation. The final ruling on property distribution was 
made pursuant to a memorandum decision dated March 2, 1987. 
Findings of fact/ conclusions of law/ and judgment and decree 
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of divorce were signed by the Court and filed on June 22, 
1987/ following a hearing held on post-trial motions on 
June 5, 1987. 
3. Disposition in the District Court. 
Pursuant to plaintiff-respondent's motion to 
clarify findings of fact and conclusion$ of law and decree of 
divorce/ and defendant-appellant's motion for the court to 
reevaluate assets, Judge Hyde accepted £n substance the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and decree of divorce 
prepared by plaintiff-respondent's attorney/ and refused to 
reevaluate the two assets requested by defendant-appellant. 
4. Statement of Material Facts. 
Appellant's statement of the cpase does not set 
forth fully or accurately the evidence which has a bearing on 
the issues on appeal. The parties were married to each other 
on June 18, 1970 (T. 4). At the time ot the divorce, 
plaintiff-respondent (hereinafter referred to as Wife) was 42 
and defendant-appellant (hereinafter referred to as Husband) 
was 58 (T. 4). Wife has a master's decree in special 
education with additional training in counseling/ and at the 
time of the divorce was employed in her sixth year as a 
counselor at Ogden High School (T. 5 & $). Husband is a 
sales representative for Kraft Foods. fle has been so 
employed for 24 years (T. 7). The parties are the parents of 
three children, a daughter 10, a son 7, and a daughter 2 
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(T. 7). Each of the parties sought custody of the children 
in these proceedings/ and Husband is not appealing the trial 
court's award of custody to Wife entered pursuant to a 
three-day trial. Husband's taxable income is $2/167 per 
month (R.46) and Wife's taxable income is $2/797 per month 
(R. 42). Wife did not seek alimony (T. 43)/ and was awarded 
child support of $139 per month for each of the three 
children (R. 85). Each was ordered to pay his or her own 
attorney's fees and court costs. 
The assets of the marriage consist of the 
following: 
(a) A home in Huntsville/ Utah. This home was 
appraised/ pursuant to an agreement between the parties 
and their attorneys/ by Allan C. Heiskanen/ a certified 
appraiser/ and by agreement each of the parties paid 
one-half of the appraisal fee (T. 8 & 9). The amount of 
said appraisal was $95/600 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2) and 
the mortgage on said home was $9/508 (T. 10)/ leaving a 
net equity pursuant to said appraisal of $86/092. 
Shortly thereafter Husband had the home appraised by 
another certified appraiser/ Lester Froerer/ whose 
appraisal was $107/000 (T. 233 & 287). Said appraisal 
was offered into evidence by Husband and admitted 
(T. 233 & Defendant's Exhibit 7). The net amount of 
said appraisal after deduction of the mortgage is 
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$97/492. Husband testified there Was a third appraisal 
for $95/000 (T. 287) leaving a net equity of $85,492 
after deduction of the mortgage. husband testified/ 
notwithstanding the three appraisals/ he would pay 
$120/000 for the home (T. 233) although he did not have 
the money to do so and would have to cash in his thrift 
plan and borrow money to refinance the home (T. 235). 
The court placed a value on the equity in said home of 
$90/000. 
(b) A 1984 Subaru in which the court determined 
there was an equity of $1/693. This was based upon 
Wife's testimony of a value one-half way between the 
high and low blue book on said vehicle/ minus the debt 
owing thereon (T. 12). 
(c) Household furniture and furnishings/ together 
with mower/ snowblower/ and other Equipment which 
Husband had appraised at $5/829 (Defendant's Exhibit 2) 
and which value was accepted by th$ court. 
(d) Wife's jewelry on which the court placed a 
value of $5/100/ which is the same as an appraisal made 
by John's Jewelry Company (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3). 
(e) Certain coins which were appraised by G&I 
Coins for $2/405 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4) and found by 
the court to have that value. 
(f) Husband's ring/ which he valued at $300 
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(Defendant's Exhibit 1). 
(g) A collection of guns which the court 
determined to have a value of $7,035, which is the value 
Husband placed thereon in his pre-trial affidavit 
(R. 47) and in his answers to interrogatories (T. 18). 
(h) Retirement benefits accrued by Wife through 
the Utah Retirement Systems, having a value of 
$12,197.44 (T. 20 & Plaintiff's Exhibit 5). 
(i) A pension plan through Husband's employer, 
Kraft, Inc. As a part of discovery, Wife's counsel 
obtained from Kraft, Inc. a summary of Husband's 
benefits under the plan (Plaintiff's Exhibits 6, 7 & 8), 
which reflected that if Husband terminated his 
employment at the time of the response, he would be 
entitled to receive $58,995.66. (Paragraph 13 of 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 8). Husband began participating in 
this plan in February, 1963 (T. 23), which was 24 years 
prior to the date of the divorce trial. At the time of 
the divorce, he had been married to Wife for almost 17 
years. Wife proposed therefore that 17/24 of $58,995 be 
considered a marital asset (T. 23 & 24), which amounted 
to $41,788. The court determined the marital value of 
this asset to be $41,000 and Husband did not appeal from 
that determination. 
(j) A thrift plan accrued by Husband through his 
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employment at Kraft, Inc. Similar information regarding 
this plan was obtained by Wife's cdunsel from Kraft, 
Inc. (Plaintiff's Exhibits 6, 7, & 9), and Kraft, Inc. 
stated that this is a defined contribution plan and that 
if Husband terminated his employment on the date of 
their response, he would be entitled to receive 
$26,394.08 (Paragraph 13 of Plaintiff's Exhibit 9). 
This plan was established in 1979 $nd the amount 
indicated was all accrued during tlje marriage (T. 24). 
Under said plan, Husband had three alternatives, one of 
which was known as a guaranteed interest fund and in 
which his benefits were invested at the time Kraft 
stated their value was $26,394 (T. 295-296). Shortly 
thereafter, Husband transferred $1^/360 thereof from the 
guaranteed interest fund to a stocH fund, wherein the 
value of the stock would fluctuate up and down (T. 297-
299). The most current statement is to the amount in 
said account at the date of the trial was set forth in 
Husband's Exhibit 5, showing a valine of $23,929.81. The 
court rounded the value of said fu^ id to $24,000.00 
(Memorandum Decision R. 87) without any reduction for 
tax consequences or penalty for ea^ly withdrawal. 
Wife was awarded the home, with an equity 
determined by the court to be $90,000, Subject to her paying 
the mortgage thereon, and subject, also, to a non-interest 
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bearing lien in favor of Husband/ to be paid upon a sale of 
the home/ upon Wife's remarriage/ or not later than March 2, 
1990. The assets awarded to the parties/ together with the 
values placed thereon by the trial court/ are as follows: 
TO WIFE: 
Home $90,000.00 
Car 1,693.00 
Furni ture 4,340.00 
Jewelry 5,100.00 
Coins 2/405.00 
Mower and snowblower 800.00 
Her retirement 12/197.00 
Sub-total 116,535.00 
Less lien on home -22,000.00 
TOTAL $94,535.00 
TO HUSBAND: 
Furniture $ 105.00 
Ring 300.00 
Firearms 7,035.00 
Kraft Pension Plan 41,000.00 
Kraft Thrift Plan 24,000.00 
Sub-total 72,000.00 
Plus lien on home +22,000.00 
TOTAL $94,440.00 
Wife has been required to retain the services of 
legal counsel to represent her in this appeal and has 
incurred attorney's fees and costs on appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In valuing the family home, the trial court relied 
upon three expert appraisals, one made by an appraiser chosen 
and paid for by both parties, a second by an appraiser chosen 
and paid for by Husband, and a third being an appraisal 
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testified to by Husband, The value of $90/000 chosen by the 
trial court was an average of the three appraisals. 
Husband's offer to purchase the home lot $120/000 was made by 
him knowing that in all likelihood the home would be awarded 
to Wife/ and was an attempt on his part to over-inflate the 
value of said home in order to increase the equity he claimed 
therein. It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial 
court to accept the average of the appraisals and to find 
that Husband's offer to purchase the hoijne for $120/000 was "a 
meaningless bunch of nonsense". 
The value of $24/000 set by the trial court for the 
Kraft thrift plan was based upon Husband's own testimony and 
a summary of the balance in his account provided to him by 
Kraft/ Inc. and inroduced by him as his Exhibit 5, setting 
forth the value thereof at $23/929.81 (which the Court 
rounded to $24,000). The determination of the value of said 
plan and its award to Husband did not constitute a "taxable 
event" under Utah law; warranting the court's taking into 
consideration possible future tax consequences and penalties 
for early withdrawal. Husband's claim that he would need to 
make an early withdrawal to pay Wife he^ r equity in the home 
no longer had substance when the trial court awarded the home 
to Wife and ordered her to pay Husband'$ equity. Husband 
gave no other valid reason for making ah early withdrawal/ 
and did not need the proceeds of said fiind to satisfy any 
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other order of the court. The trial court did not commit 
error in refusing to take into consideration tax consequences 
and penalties for early withdrawal. 
The court made findings of fact regarding the value 
of each of the marital assets based upon testimony and 
exhibits introduced by the parties/ accepting some valuations 
proposed by Wife and some proposed by Husband. The findings 
of value made by the trial court were all supported by the 
evidence and did not require a detailed explanation by the 
trial court as to the reason he selected each particular 
valuation. 
Wife is entitled to an award of attorney's fees 
herein/ inasmuch as the appeal is frivolous and there is no 
substance to Husband's argument/ and he is attempting to take 
unconscionable advantage of Wife in this appeal. The case 
should be remanded to the trial court for a determination of 
Wife's attorney's fees. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
THE VALUATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL 
PROPERTY BY REFUSING TO ESTABLISH THE VALUE OF 
THE MARITAL RESIDENCE ON THE BASIS OF AN OFFER 
TO PURCHASE MADE BY THE APPELLANT-HUSBAND 
The Utah Supreme Court/ in the case of Burnham v. 
Burnham/ 716 P.2d 781 (Utah 1986), stated: 
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"The trial court in a divorce action is 
tion in adjusting 
terests of the 
permitted considerable discre 
the financial and property in 
parties, and its actions are Entitled to a 
presumption of validity. ArgVle v. Argyle, 
Utah, 688 P.2d 468 (citationsr omitted)." 
The burden is therefore on Hu&band to overcome that 
presumption, which he has failed to do. Husband's only 
argument is that the court failed to accept his proposed 
valuations with respect to the marital residence and the 
Kraft thrift plan. This Court stated, in the case of Ebbert 
v. Ebbert, 744 P.2d 1019 (Utah App. 1987), that: 
"'Determining and assigning values to 
marital property is a matter for the trial 
court, and this Court will no^ disturb those 
determinations absent a showihg of clear abuse 
of discretion.1 Talley v. Talley, 739 P.2d 83, 
84 (Utah App. 1987). Plaintiff's main argument 
is the court failed to accept any of his 
proposed valuations. Such action does not 
constitute an abuse of discretion." 
With respect to the valuation of the home, Husband 
in his brief has led this Court to believe that the only 
evidence which the trial court had before it regarding the 
value of the family home was his own offer to purchase the 
home for $120,000, and the Wife's expert appraisal of $95,600 
(Appellant's Brief, page 10). He failed to point out that he 
also obtained an expert appraisal for $1107,000 and at his 
request, it was admitted into evidence (T. 233, 287 & 
Defendant's Exhibit 7). He also testified that there had 
been yet another appraisal for $95,000 (T. 287). With 
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respect to the $95/600 appraisal/ he; through his attorney/ 
stipulated to the obtaining of that appraisal and paid one-
half of the appraisal fee (T. 8 & 9), 
The average of the three expert appraisals is 
$99,200 and after deducting the mortgage of $9,508 therefrom, 
there is an average equity of $89/692. This is almost 
identical to the $90/000 of net equity determined by the 
trial court. 
In the case of Workman v. Workman/ 652 P.2d 931 
(Utah 1982)/ the Utah Supreme Court held that there was no 
abuse of discretion in the trial court's valuation of real 
property based upon a professional appraisal of $119/360/ 
rather than three offers obtained by husband/ one for $70/000 
and the other two for $51/000. The Court stated/ at page 
933: 
"We also find no abuse of discretion in 
the district court's valuation of the Park City 
property at $119/360—the appraised value— 
rather than at $70/000. The court is obviously 
free to adopt the valuation of a professional 
appraiser in preference to the husband's 
unsubstantiated allegations of random offers." 
It is obvious that in this case/ it was not an 
abuse of discretion for the trial court to accept the 
valuations of three appraisers in preference to an offer by 
Husband. 
It is apparent that in the present case the trial 
court averaged the three professional appraisals in 
- 12 -
determining the equity in the family hoitte. This is not an 
abuse of discretion. In the case of Neymeyer v. Newmeyer/ 
745 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court held that 
where a husband's appraisal of a family home was $122,000 and 
a wife's appraisal thereof was $112,000^ it was not error for-
the trial court to fix the value of sai$ home at $117,000, •$ 
which was the average of the two. At p£ge 1278, the Court 
stated: 
"(in adopting proposed values for marital 
assets, trial court may average conflicting 
values given by experts to arrive at an 
equitable solution)." 
The case of Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695 (Utah 
1985), cited by Husband for the proposition that a party can 
state his own opinion as to the value of real property and 
such valuation may properly be considered, is distinguishable 
from the present case. In the Berger case, the court 
accepted the husband's opinion as to th£ value of two patents 
which he testified were valueless. In affirming the trial 
court's admission of such testimony, th^ Utah Supreme Court 
pointed out that "His testimony regarding the patents' value 
was the only relevant evidence adduced at trial." In the 
present case, the trial court had before it considerable 
other relevant evidence, consisting of two expert appraisals 
admitted into evidence and a third appraisal testified to by 
Husband. 
Husband was aware at the time of the trial that 
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Wife wanted very much to be awarded the family home (T. 37). 
She has resided there for approximately nine years (R. 43) 
and at the time of the trial/ Husband had been living 
elsewhere for approximately one year (R. 8 & R. 17). The 
home had been built by her father and she testified that 
there was a lot of love and memories connected with it/ and 
that her children were happy and content in that home and 
area (T. 38). She was able to afford the monthly payment and 
could not rent a comparable place for the amount of her 
mortgage payment (T. 38). The home is situated within one 
and one-half blocks of her parents in the small town of 
Huntsville/ Utah (T. 46) and her mother comes to the family 
home and tends the children while Wife is at work (T. 46 & 
47). Her father picks the children up in bad weather and 
takes them to and from school (T. 47 & 48). Wife contends 
that when Husband offered to purchase the home for $120/000/ 
he realized that in all likelihood the home would be awarded 
to her and his offer was made for the purpose of attempting 
to inflate the value of the home so that he would ultimately 
receive a more substantial lien against it. When she filed 
for divorce/ Husband became extremely spiteful and revengeful 
toward her and threatened that if she divorced him/ he would 
break her financially and run up court costs so that she 
would lose her home and her place at work and in the 
community/ indicating that it was his intention to "totally 
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ruin me" (T. 62). A witness/ Faye Layt^>n/ testified that 
Husband came to her home and/ referring to Wife; stated/ "He 
was going to bankrupt her financially/ Ifie would take her 
through the courts/ he would have a jury trial/ it would last 
a week/ he would make sure he bankrupted her good name/ and 
her employment/ and that he would make Certain that she lost 
her job/ and that she would lose the home." (T. 195) His 
spiteful attitude toward her is further evidenced by his 
threats to take away her children by revealing to townspeople 
in their small community and to her children that as a young 
woman she gave birth to a child out-of-wedlock which she 
placed for adoption (T. 63-67). 
Husband proposed that he woul<3 take the home at a 
value of $120/000/ knowing that his threat of taking the home 
from her would be realized if the court accepted his proposal 
and that by making such an offer/ he woqld be setting the 
value of the home at an unrealistically high figure if the 
court awarded it to Wife. In Husband's proposal to the court 
(Defendant's Exhibit 1/ page 4)/ he suggested that the court 
give him the home at an equity of $110,tOO ($120,000 less the 
mortgage) and that he then would pay Wi^e $65/646.50 as a 
settlement/ knowing that in all likelihood the court would 
not take the home away from Wife and th0 children/ and 
obviously realizing that he did not hav$ the means to pay 
that amount and that in order to get the money/ he would have 
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to "hardship that money" out of his thrift plan (T. 235), 
thereby paying some $14,000 in penalties and taxes for early 
withdrawal, and then would have to borrow the balance to pay 
Wife off (T. 235). 
It is obvious that Husband did this so that he 
could make an alternative proposal that Wife take the home on 
the basis of his $120,000 offer to purchase, thereby having 
to pay him $45,053.50 for his equity (Defendant's Exhibit 1, 
page 4) rather than the $22,000 lien the trial court actually 
gave him against the home. The trial judge saw through 
Husband's maneuvering and rightfully found that "His offer of 
$120,000 for the house is a meaningless bunch of nonsense." 
(Motion to Clarify T. 22). 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
THE VALUATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL 
ASSETS BY FAILING TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE 
EARLY WITHDRAWAL PENALTY AND TAX CONSEQUENCES 
OF SUCH WITHDRAWAL IN VALUING APPELLANT-
HUSBAND'S KRAFT THRIFT PLAN 
At the time of the divorce, Husband had an 
investment in a pension plan at Kraft, Inc. with a value of 
$58,995.66 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 8). The trial court ruled 
that $41,000 of this amount was a marital asset and Husband 
did not appeal from that determination. 
Husband also had an investment in a thrift plan at 
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Kraft/ Inc./ which was a defined contribution plan (T. 295)/ 
all of which was accrued during the marfiage (T. 25). Wife 
was informed by Kraft/ Inc. that as of ^ay 31/ 1986 there was 
in said account the sum of $26,394.08 (t« 24 & Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 9). Husband had admitted into evidence a more recent 
statement from Kraft/ Inc. indicating tjiat as of 
September 30/ 1986/ the closest date to the trial for which 
reports were available/ the value of sajld account was 
$23,929.81 (T. 219 & Defendant's Exhibit 5). The trial court 
accepted Husband's valuation/ rounding |t to $24#000 (R. 87). 
Wife does not object to that valuation. 
Husband contends that the tri^l court should have 
reduced the $24,000 value to $10,811 to reflect what he 
claims to be a 41 per cent deduction for income taxes and a 
10 per cent penalty for early withdrawal. 
There was conflicting testimony at the trial as to 
the future of the thrift plan. Husband testified that the 
parties had set it up for the purpose o£ financing college 
educations for their children (T. 261 & T. 300), and that it 
would be another seven or eight years before the children 
would be using those funds (T. 300). He also testified that 
he was almost 59 years of age (T. 235) ind that he planned to 
retire in three years at the age of 62 (T. 239) when he could 
withdraw the thrift plan without penalty, and could structure 
the withdrawal under various payment methods to minimize or 
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eliminate taxes (Plaintiff's Exhibit 11/ page 18). He also 
testified that if he were awarded the home and had to pay 
Wife for her equity/ he would have to "hardship that money 
out" of the thrift plan and then refinance (T. 235). 
The trial judge awarded the home to Wife and 
ordered that she pay a $22/000 lien to Husband within three 
years/ thereby removing the reason Husband stated he would 
need to make the early withdrawal. The court recognized that 
for Husband to voluntarily make such an early withdrawal 
would be economically disastrous when the alternative was to 
wait a short while until his retirement when the money could 
be taken out without penalty and the tax consequences could 
be structured. Defendant gave no other reasons that would 
necessitate his withdrawing said fund. He was earning a 
substantial income ($26/000 per year)/ he testified of no 
debts/ had no alimony obligation to Wife/ and was required to 
pay relatively modest child support of $139 per month for 
each of the three children. He had no lump sum obligation of 
any kind to Wife arising out of the divorce. The trial court 
acted within its proper discretion in refusing to discount 
the thrift plan for penalty and tax consequences of early 
withdrawal. Under the circumstances/ the court was 
completely justified in concluding that if Husband had/ in 
fact/ withdrawn the thrift plan after the divorce trial/ he 
had done it out of spite (Motion to Clarify T. 16 & 17). 
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The law in Utah on this subject is set forth in the 
case of Alexander v. Alexander, 737 P.2ft 221 (Utah 1987), 
wherein the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's 
refusal to reduce the present value of & husband's profit 
sharing plan to account for income tax liability that could 
be imposed in the future. The Court stated, at page 224: 
"We also decline to disturb the trial 
court's valuation of the profit-sharing plan. 
The trial court did not reduc4 the present 
value of the plan to account for income tax 
liability that could be imposed in the future. 
Plaintiff has not argued and it does not appear 
that the valuation of the profit-sharing plan 
was itself a taxable event; therefore, we do 
not think the trial court's refusal to 
speculate about hypothetical future 
consequences was an abuse of discretion. See 
Gilbert v. Gilbert, 628 P.2d 1088, 1089 (Mont. 
1981) Taffirming a property division in which 
the trial judge did not adjust the market value 
of a retirement account in anticipation of 
future tax liability)." (emphasis added) 
The main thrust of the case ot Gilbert v. Gilbert, 
628 P.2d 1088 (Mont. 1981), cited in th0 Alexander case, is 
also that "the property distribution ordered by the District 
Court includes no presently taxable events and triggers no 
tax liability." (Page 1089) (emphasis ^dded) 
The taxable event concept appears to be the general 
rule in this country and is followed by Jnany other cases. 
See Weaver v. Weaver, 324 S.E.2d 915 (N.C.App. 1985) wherein 
the Court stated, at page 920: 
"The trial court is not required to 
consider possible taxes when determining the 
value of property in the absence of proof that 
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a taxable event has occurred during the 
marriage or will occur with the division of the 
marital property. In re Marriage of Fonstein/ 
17 Cal.3d 738, 131 Cal.Rptr. 873, 552 P.2d 1169 
(1976); accord Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 331 
A.2d 257 (1975)." (emphasis added) 
It is important to note that in the present case, 
there was no "taxable event" ordered by the court and 
accordingly, the trial court was correct in refusing to 
consider penalties and tax consequences for early withdrawal. 
Other factors considered by the courts on this 
issue are: (1) did the court decree require by its terms the 
liquidation of the retirement plan? (2) was it necessary to 
liquidate the retirement plan in order to have means to 
comply with other provisions of the divorce decree? 
See the case of Qazi v. Qazi, 492 N.E.2d 692 
(Indiana App.3 Dist. 1986), wherein it was held that if 
liquidation of a husband's pension plan was not ordered by 
the trial court, any possible tax consequences associated 
with liquidation were not to be considered. See also In Re 
Marriage of Hayne, 334 N.W.2d 347 (Iowa App. 1983), wherein 
the Court stated: 
"Although liquidation of respondent's Keogh 
plan would have entailed certain tax 
liabilities, the court did not order him to 
liquidate his plan, and it is evident that 
respondent had other assets available to meet 
the court's orders without liquidating it. It 
was no error for the court to consider the full 
value of the Keogh plan without figuring in the 
potential tax liability upon liquidation when 
determining the value of marital property for 
division under the terms of the decree." 
(emphasis added) 
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In the present case/ no liquidation was ordered by 
the court and Husband had ample assets and financial means to 
comply with the decree of the court without liquidating his 
thrift plan. 
Of the eight cases cited by Hpsband in his brief 
dealing with the tax consequences of retirement benefits/ 
four of said cases refused to consider the tax consequences 
and held that the retirement benefits should be valued 
without taking into consideration tax consequences. See 
Johnson v. Johnson/ 638 P.2d 705, 131 Aifiz. 38 (1981); In Re 
Marriage of Bayer, 687 P.2d 537 (Col.App. 1984); In Re 
Marriage of Rowe, 744 P.2d 717 (Ariz.App. 1987); and 
Alexander v. Alexander, 737 P.2d 221 (Utah 1987). Two of the 
remaining cited cases did not address the issue. See In Re 
Marriage of DiPasquale, 716 P.2d 223 (M0nt. 1986), and 
Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988). Although the 
case of Dice v. Dice, 742 P.2d 205 (Wyo.| 1987) cited by 
Husband holds that the income tax consequences of withdrawing 
money from a corporation and profit shading account should be 
taken into consideration, that case is rfeadily 
distinguishable from the present case. In Dice, the trial 
court ordered a division of assets which necessitated the 
immediate liquidation of the profit shading account in order 
to provide a lump sum distribution to wijfe. The Wyoming 
Supreme Court ruled only that under the circumstances of that 
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case should the tax consequences of such a liquidation be 
taken into consideration. At page 208/ the Court stated: 
"We only determine that withdrawal after cash 
value should be reflected in divorce-decree 
division if an immediate cash payment is 
required.n 
Again/ in the present case, no such "immediate cash 
payment" was required of Husband by the Court. 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT MADE ADEQUATE FINDINGS OF 
FACT TO SUPPORT ITS DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL 
ASSETS 
In this case/ the trial court made five pages of 
findings of fact on the issues of child custody/ visitation/ 
and distribution of property (addendum Exhibit D)• The court 
placed a specific equity value on each of the assets as 
follows: 
(a) 1984 Subaru - $1,693, based on Wife's 
testimony of a value one-half way between high and 
low blue book (T. 12). 
(b) Household furniture, furnishings, 
lawnmower, snowblower, and other equipment - $5/829/ 
based on Husband's expert appraisal (Defendant's 
Exhibit 2). 
(c) Wife's jewelry - $5,100/ based upon Wife's 
expert appraisal (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3). 
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(d) Coins - $2/405/ based upOn Wife's expert 
appraisal (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4). 
(e) Husband's ring - $300/ b£sed upon 
Husband's valuation (Defendant's Exhibit 1). 
(f) Gun collection - $7/035/ based on 
Husband's testimony and answers to interrogatories 
(R. 47 & T. 18). 
(g) Wife's retirement - $12/3[97.44/ based on 
membership statement from Utah Retirement Systems 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 5). 
(h) Kraft/ Inc. pension plan - $41/000/ based 
on statement from Kraft/ Inc. (Paragraph 13 of 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 8 and discounted by the court to 
reflect 17 years of marriage as compared to 24 years 
of accrual) (T. 23 & 24). 
None of the above valuations v^ ere appealed by 
Husband. 
The only valuations disputed by Husband are the 
family home and the Kraft thrift plan. The statement made by 
Husband on page 20 of his brief that "We know that the court 
adopted the value sponsored by Mrs. Ellison for both the home 
and the thrift plan/ but we do not know why." is clearly 
erroneous. Wife proposed that the value of the home should 
be based upon her expert appraisal/ less the mortgage/ which 
totaled $86,092 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 12/ line 1). The court 
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determined the equity in said home to be $90,000. This is 
the average of Wife's expert appraisal (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 2), Defendant's expert appraisal (Defendant's 
Exhibit 7), and the third appraisal testified to by Husband 
(T. 287). 
Regarding the thrift plan, the statement made by 
Husband on page 20 of his brief that "The valuation of the 
thrift plan is void of any indication of how the court 
reached the decision to adopt the $24,000 figure." is also 
erroneous. Wife proposed that the thrift plan be valued at 
$26,394 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 12, paragraph 13), but the court 
accepted Husband's valuation of $23,929.81 (rounding it to 
$24,000) (Defendant's Exhibit 5), and then refused to 
discount said amount for tax consequences and early 
withdrawal penalties. The law does not require that the 
court go through a lengthy explanation as to how he arrived 
at the value of each particular asset so long as there is 
sufficient evidence to support the finding. See In Re 
Marriage of Sessions, 753 P.2d 1306 (Mont. 1988) wherein the 
Court stated: 
"When conflicting expert testimony is given, 
the trier of fact has full discretion to give 
weight to the testimony as he sees fit. 
(citations omitted) The court chose to rely on 
wife's expert and substantial evidence supports 
the court's finding here." 
In the case of Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 
- 24 -
1985)/ the Utah Supreme Court ruled thatt the trial court 
failed to make adequate findings where it simply stated that 
the distribution was "fair and equitable" without placing 
specific values on the assets. The Couift pointed out that 
"Neither the memorandum decision nor th^ findings assigned 
individual values to each of the assets or a total value to 
the cumulative share being awarded to each party." 
(Page 1073) and went on to point out that "Normally/ we would 
grant the remedy sought by the wife and remand for findings 
on the specific values of the assets." (Page 1074) The 
present case clearly meets the criteria set forth in Jones/ 
in that the trial judge assigned individual values to each of 
the assets and also/ a total value to the cumulative share 
being awarded to each party. 
In the case of Pearson v. Pearson/ 561 P.2d 1080 
(Utah 1977)/ the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"In regard to the matter of the 
sufficiency of findings of faqt/ a substantial 
compliance with Rule 52/ Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure/ is sufficient/ and findings of fact 
and conclusions of law will support a judgment/ 
though they are very general/ 
most respects follow the alleg 
pleadings. Findings should bel 
ultimate facts and if they asc| 
jwhere they in 
ation of the 
limited to the 
lertain ultimate 
facts/ and sufficiently conforkn to the 
pleadings and the evidence to support the 
judgment^ they will be regarded as sufficient/ 
though not as full and as complete as might be 
desired." (emphasis added) 
The findings made by the court in the present case 
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"ascertain ultimate facts/ and sufficiently conform to the 
pleadings and the evidence to support the judgment". 
Clearly/ the findings are sufficient. 
In the case of Hurley v. Hurley/ 721 P.2d 1279 
(Mont. 1986) cited by Husband for the proposition that when 
faced with widely conflicting valuations the court must give 
reasons for the selection of one value over another/ the 
Court goes on to hold that where the evidence shows that the 
wife's method of valuation was more sound than the method 
suggested by husband, any error in the court's failure to 
give reasons for the selection of one value over another is 
harmless. In the present case, even if the Appellate Court 
should hold that more detailed reasons should have been given 
by the trial court for its valuation/ such error would/ in 
fact/ be harmless where the method followed by the court is 
more sound than the method suggested by husband. 
In setting forth U.R.C.P. 52(a)/ on page 4 of his 
brief/ it is interesting that Husband deleted therefrom the 
sentence which reads: "Findings of fact/ whether based on 
oral or documentary evidence/ shall not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous/ and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of 
the witnesses." As it relates to this case/ this is the most 
significant sentence in the rule. Husband has failed to 
establish that the findings of fact are "clearly erroneous"/ 
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and the Court of Appeals should affirm the decision of the 
trial court. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT'S APPEAL IS FRIVOLOUS/ JUSTIFYING THE 
AWARD TO RESPONDENT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND 
COURT COSTS RELATED TO THIS APPEAL 
Rule 33/ Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals 
provides as follows: 
(a) Damages for delay or 
these rules is 
it shall award 
appeal. If the court determines that a motion 
made or an appeal taken under 
either frivolous or for delay/ 
just damages and single or dou|ble costs/ 
including reasonable attorney fees, to the 
prevailing party." (addendum Exhibit B) 
frivolous 
In the 
1987), this 
case of Eames v. Eames; 735 P.2d 395 (Utah 
Court held that a husband's appeal from the App.  
divorce court's property division and al 
frivolous and awarded the wife attorney' 
pursuant to Rule 33(a) cited above. Wit 
property division aspect of said appeal/ this Court stated/ 
at page 397: 
appellant has the burden of showing 
imony award was 
s fees on appeal/ 
h respect to the 
"An 
that the 
manifest 
an abuse 
trial court's award 
injustice or inequity 
of that broad discretl 
the financial needs and proper 
the parties].'" 
'korks such a 
as to clearly be 
ion [in adjusting 
|ty interests of 
The Court went on to state: 
"The Court recognizes the 
to argue in an attempt to corre 
party deems to be error in the 
However/ when there is no basics 
argument presented and when th 
is mischaracterized and missta 
must question the party's moti 
shows the trial judge making F[i 
dividing the property/ and awa 
after a careful consideration 
evidence. Defendant ignores t 
right of a party 
ct what that 
court below. 
for the 
evidence or law 
ed, the Court 
es. The record 
ndings of Fact/ 
ding support 
f all the 
is." 
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In the present case, the trial judge made findings 
of fact/ assigning values to each asset and dividing the 
property after a careful consideration of all of the 
evidence. Husband in this case misstated the evidence on 
page 20 of his brief when he said that "The valuation of the 
thrift plan is void of any indication of how the court 
reached the decision to adopt the $24,000 figure." This was 
the testimony of Husband himself and was based upon his own 
exhibit, as previously set forth. The evidence is further 
mischaracterized when, on page 20 of his brief, Husband 
stated, "We know the court adopted the value sponsored by 
Mrs. Ellison for both the home and the thrift plan, but we do 
not know why." The court did not adopt the value sponsored 
by Mrs. Ellison for either the home or the thrift plan. With 
respect to the home, her appraisal reflected an equity of 
$86,092, as compared to a $90,000 finding by the court, and 
she introduced evidence of a value in the thrift plan of 
$26,394, as compared to the $24,000 testified to by husband 
and accepted by the court. 
Husband also misstated the law when, on page 4 of 
his brief, he deleted from U.R.C.P. 52(a) the sentence which 
reads: "Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity 
of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses." 
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Wife is entitled to attorney1$ fees and costs 
incurred in this appeal and the case shpuld be remanded to 
the trial court for a determination of said attorney's fees 
and costs. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the trial coutft should be affirmed 
and respondent should be awarded her attorney's fees and 
court costs incurred in connection with this appeal/ with the 
amount thereof to be determined by the tirial court on remand. 
Respectfully submitted, this 
23rd dajy of Septeniber, 1988. 
C. Gerald Parker 
PARKER, THORNLEY & CRITCHLOW 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 23rd day of 
September/ 1988, I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing Respondent's Brief/ by placing the same 
in the United States Mail/ postage prepaid/ and addressed to 
appellant's attorney/ L. Zane Gill/ at 5250 South 300 West/ 
Suite 55, Salt Lake City, Utah 84107. 
C. Gerald Parker 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT A: Rule 52, Utah Rules of Cilvil Procedure 
EXHIBIT B: Rule 33, Rules of the Uta|h Court of Appeals 
EXHIBIT C: Memorandum Decision 
EXHIBIT D: Findings of Fact and Concjlusions of Law 
EXHIBIT E: Judgment and Decree of Divorce 
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UTAH RULES OP CfV^ PROCEDURE 
Rule 52. Findings by the court 
(a) Effect, In all actions tried upon the facta without a jury or with an 
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately ita 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall simi* 
larly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the 
grounds of ita action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposea of 
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and clue regard shall be given 
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court follow* 
ing the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of 
decision filed by the court, The trial court need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The 
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for ita 
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 66, and 59 
when the motion is based on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 daya after 
entry of judgment the court may amend ita findings or make additional find-
ings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with 
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made 
in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not 
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to 
such findings or has made either a motion to amend {them, a motion forjudge 
ment, or a motion for a new trial. 
EXHIBIT A 
RULES OF THE UTAH 0OURT OF APPEALS 
Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery 
of attorney fees, 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. If the court determines that 
a motion made or an appeal taken under these rules is either frivolous or for 
delay, it shall award just damages and single or double costs, including rea-
sonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. 
(b) Disciplinary action for inadequate representation. The court may 
impose appropriate sanctions against any counsel who inadequately repre-
sents a client on appeal. 
EXHIBIT B 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SUZANNE LYNN ELLISON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT EUGENE ELLISON, 
Defendant. 
i MEMORANDUM DECISION 
) Case No. 94781 
In the hearing of this matter, % gave a bench ruling on 
all matters other than a division of th^ assets, and they shall 
be as follows: 
Plaintiff is awarded the home, with an equity value of 
$90,000; the 1984 Subaru, value $1,693; household furniture and 
fixtures, valued at $4,340; her jewelry, $5,100; silver and gold 
coins in her possession, $2,405; lawn mower and snow blower, 
$800; her Utah State retirement, $l2J,197; for a total of 
$116,535. 
Defendant is awarded household furniture and fixtures in 
his possession, $105; his diamond ring, $$00; the Noble Affiliate 
Stock is not apparently a marital asset. He is awarded the gun 
collection, $7,035; his bank account apparently was non-existent, 
as he had to borrow money when he move<3. I value his Kraft 
Pension Plan at $41,000; the Thrift Plan et $24,000, for a total 
of $72,440. In order to equalize the assets, the husband 
FYMIRIT P. 
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defendant is to have a lien against the Huntsville home in the 
sum of $22/000, The lien shall be non-interest bearing and shall 
be payable if the wife sells the home or remarries. As to having 
it due when the youngest child reaches majority, this is far too 
long a period of time. The home can easily be refinanced, and it 
would be recommended that it be done while interest rates are 
low. At any rate, the time period for re-payment shall not 
exceed three years from date. 
DATED this j£_ day of March, 1987. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision to C. Gerald Parker, 
Attorney for Plaintiff, 2610 Washington Boulevard, Ogden, Utah 
84401, and to Pete N. Vlahos, Attorney for Defendant, 2447 Kiesel 
Avenue, Ogden, Utah 84401, on this ^  day of March, 1987. 
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C. Gerald Parker, #2520 
PARKER, THORNLEY & CRITCHLOW 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2610 Washington Blvd. 
P. O. Box 107 
Ogden, Utah 84402 
Telephone: 399-3303 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF f^EBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SUZANNE LYNN ELLISON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT EUGENE ELLISON, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civ^l No. 94781 
The above-entitled action came on regularly for trial 
conunencing the 23rd day of February, 198[7, and continuing through 
February 24 and February 25, before the honorable Ronald O. Hyde, 
one of the Judges of the above-entitled £ourt sitting without a 
jury; the plaintiff appeared in person ajid was represented by her 
counsel, C. Gerald Parker, and the defendant appeared in person 
and was represented by his counsel, Pete N. Vlahos. The Court 
heard evidence introduced on behalf of bpth of the parties, 
including testimony from several witnesses on behalf of each 
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party, and after being fully advised in the premises, the Court 
made a partial ruling and then took the remaining issues under 
advisement. The Court thereafter issued its Memorandum Decision 
regarding the remaining issues, pursuant to which plaintiff's 
attorney prepared a draft of proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce, to which defendant 
filed Objections. A hearing on plaintiff's Motion to Clarify 
Findings of Fact and on defendant's Objections, together with a 
hearing on defendant's Motion for Court to Re-Evaluate Assets was 
heard on June 5, 1987, pursuant to which the Court clarified the 
findings of fact and refused to re-evaluate assets. The Court 
now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That plaintiff is a bona fide and actual resident of 
Weber County, Utah, and has been for more than three months 
immediately prior to the commencement of this action. 
2. That plaintiff and defendant were married to each 
other at Eden, Utah, on June 18, 1970, and ever since said time 
have been and now are husband and wife. 
3. That the parties are the parents of three minor 
children, to-wit: LINDA LEE ELLISON, age 10 years, born June 4, 
1976; DAVID ROBERT ELLISON, age 7 years, born October 8, 1979; 
and ELIZABETH KATHRYN ELLISON, age 2 years, born April 2, 1984. 
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Plaintiff has by far better parenting ^kills than does defendant, 
and the best interests of the children kill be served by their 
custody being awarded to plaintiff. Plaintiff's parenting skills 
are superior to those of defendant in h£r abilities as a 
homemaker and the fact that the children are cared for in their 
own home by their maternal grandmother while plaintiff is at 
work, as opposed to defendant's proposal that the children would 
be cared for in daycare centers were th^y in his custody. 
Plaintiff also has better skills in insuring that the children 
are well-fed, clothed, groomed, and educated. She has better 
skills in disciplining the children by Sending them to their room 
or withholding television. Plaintiff is more sensitive to the 
emotional needs of the children, as evi4enced by her encouraging 
a loving relationship between them and t^ ieir father, as opposed 
to his attempts to turn the children frqm her by telling them 
that she had given a baby away. Plaintiff's educational and 
employment experience have enhanced her parenting skills, in that 
she has a Bachelor's Degree in Elementary Education, a Master's 
Degree in Special Education with emphasis on the behaviorily 
handicapped, the intellectually handicapped, and those who have 
learning disabilities. She also has an additional 70 hours of 
postgraduate education in counseling and she has had 
approximately five years experience as a professional counselor 
at Ogden High School. 
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The Court interviewed each of the children at length 
individually and is satisfied that based upon their feelings and 
desires, and the findings made above, that their best interest 
will be served by their custody being awarded to plaintiff. 
4. Regarding visitation rights, the Court finds that 
serious problems exist with regard to defendant visiting the 
children and that such difficulties are not likely to improve, 
but the Court finds that defendant should continue to have the 
right to take the children at the following times: 
(a) Every other weekend from Friday at 6 
p.m. until Sunday at 6 p.m. 
(b) On alternate holidays, provided that 
plaintiff shall always have the children on 
Mother's Day and defendant shall always have 
them on Father's Day. 
(c) For two weeks at the beginning of each 
summer and for two weeks near the end of each 
summer• 
(d) On Christmas afternoon from 1 p.m. 
until a reasonable hour that evening. 
5. That during the course of the marriage, defendant 
has treated plaintiff cruelly, causing great mental distress. 
His cruel treatment has included embarrassing and demeaning 
plaintiff 
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in public; continually threatening throughout the marriage to 
tell neighbors and friends that plaintiff had given birth to a 
child out of wedlock which she had placted for adoption, 
notwithstanding the fact that he was aw^re of such incident at 
the time he married plaintiff; and by spbsequently relating said 
incident to members of the community; ai|id by causing constant 
turmoil and anxiety and fear within the family unit. 
6. That the parties have acquired assets, including the 
following: 
(a) A home at 333 South ^300 East, 
Huntsville, Utah, with an equity value of 
$90,000.00. Said property nov^  stands in the 
names of ROBERT EUGENE ELLISO^ and SUZANNE WOOD 
ELLISON, and the legal description thereof is 
as follows: 
Part of Lot 2, Block 1, Plat Cu Huntsville 
Survey, Weber County, Utah: Beginning at the 
Northeast corner of said Lot 2) thence South 
271.6 feet; thence North 8D42' West 117.75 
feet; thence North 41D53' West 22.0 feet; 
thence North 14 rods; thence E&st 8 rods to 
beginning. 
(b) A 1984 Subaru valued 4t $1,693.00. 
(c) Household furniture aftd furnishings in 
plaintiff's possession valued stt $4,340.00. 
(d) Plaintiff's jewelry valued at 
$5,100.00. 
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(e) Silver and gold coins in plaintiff's 
possession, worth $2,405.00, 
(f) Lawnmower and snowblower worth 
$800.00. 
(g) Utah State Retirement benefits accrued 
by plaintiff in the sum of $12,197.00. 
(h) Household furniture and fixtures in 
defendant's possession worth $105.00. 
(i) Defendant's diamond ring worth 
$300.00. 
(j) A gun collection worth $7,035.00. 
(k) A pension plan known as the Kraft 
Pension Plan, the value of which was accrued by 
defendant during this marriage in the sum of 
$41,000.00. 
(1) A retirement plan accrued by defendant 
during this marriage known as the Kraft Thrift 
Plan worth $24,000.00. 
(m) Personal effects of each party. 
7. That plaintiff is employed as a counselor at Ogden 
High School with a net income of approximately $1,885.00 per 
month. Defendant is employed as a sales representative at Kraft, 
Inc., with a taxable income of approximately $2,167.00 per month. 
- 6 
8. That defendant has medical and dental insurance 
available for the children through his employment. 
9. That the parties have outstanding financial 
indebtedness. 
10. That each party has retailed legal counsel to 
represent them in these proceedings and each has incurred 
attorney's fees and court costs herein. 
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From the foregoing findings of fact, the Court arrives 
as the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF L^W 
1. That plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce 
from the defendant, the same to become f|inal on the date the 
divorce decree is signed by the Court an^ l entered by the Clerk in 
the Register of Actions. 
2. That plaintiff be awarded t](ie care, custody and 
control of the three minor children of tlfie parties, to-wit: 
LINDA LEE ELLISON, DAVID ROBERT ELLISON, and ELIZABETH KATHRYN 
ELLISON. Defendant shall be granted the right to take the 
children for visitation at the following times: 
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(a) Every other weekend from Friday at 6 
p.m. until Sunday at 6 p.m. 
(b) On alternate holidays, provided that 
plaintiff shall always have the children on 
Mother's Day and defendant shall always have 
them on Father's Day. 
(c) For two weeks at the beginning of each 
summer and for two weeks near the end of each 
summer. 
(d) On Christmas afternoon from 1 p.m. 
until a reasonable hour that evening. 
Each party is enjoined and restrained from attempting to 
alienate the children from the other party and from making 
derogatory or demeaning remarks about the other party in the 
presence of the children. 
3. That plaintiff be awarded, and defendant be required 
to pay to plaintiff, the sum of $139.00 per month for the support 
and maintenance of each of the children, for a total of $417.00 
per month child support. Said support shall be paid through the 
office of the Clerk of Weber County, Utah in two equal semi-
monthly installments, with one-half of the total payment to be 
made on or before the 5th day of each month and a like amount to 
- 8 -
be paid on or before the 20th day of eath month. Said support 
shall be subject to the provisions of Title 78-45d-l, et seq., 
Utah Code Annotated. 
4. That defendant be required to maintain medical and 
dental insurance on the children of the parties through his 
employment, and each party shall be required to pay one-half of 
any such expenses which are not covered by insurance. 
5. That each party be required to pay any debts he or 
she has incurred since the separation of the parties. 
6. That plaintiff be awarded tjhe following assets: 
(a) The home at 333 South 7300 East, 
Huntsville, Utah, subject to t^ ie mortgage 
thereon. 
(b) The 1984 Subaru, subject to the debt 
thereon. 
(c) All of the household furniture and 
fixtures now in her possession. 
(d) Her jewelry, together with the silver 
and gold coins in her possession. 
(e) The lawnmower and snowblower. 
(f) Her Utah State retirement. 
(g) Her personal effects. 
7. That defendant be awarded tt^ e following assets: 
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(a) The household furniture and fixtures 
now in his possession. 
(b) His diamond ring. 
(c) The Noble Affiliate stock which is 
considered by the Court to be a non-marital 
asset. 
(d) The gun collection. 
(e) All of his retirement benefits accrued 
through the Kraft Pension Plan, together with 
all of those benefits accrued through the Kraft 
Thrift Plan. 
8. That defendant be awarded a lien against the home at 
333 South 7300 East, Huntsville, Utah, in the amount of 
$22,000.00. Said lien shall be non-interest bearing and shall be 
payable by plaintiff at such time as she sells the home, or at 
such time as she remarries; provided, however, that said lien 
shall be payable in any event not later than March 2, 1990. 
9. That each party be required to pay any attorney's 
fees and Court costs he or she has incurred herein. 
10. That each party be required to execute any deeds, 
conveyances, assignments, certificates of title, or other 
- 10 -
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documents necessary to effect the transfers set forth herein. 
Let judgment be entered accordingly. 
DATED this rj Zl day of Juns^-J.987. y 
Ronald 0[. Hyde 
District Judge 
Approved as to form and content: 
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Attorney fendant 
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SUZANNE LYNN ELLISON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT EUGENE ELLISON, 
Dfciondant. 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
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took the remaining issues under advisement, and thereafter issued 
its Memorandum Decision, pursuant to which plaintiff's attorney 
prepared a draft of proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Decree of Divorce, to which defendant filed Objections. 
A hearing on plaintiff's Motion to Clarify Findings of Fact and 
on defendant's Objections, together with a hearing on defendant's 
Motion for Court to Re-Evaluate Assets, was heard on June 5, 
1987, pursuant to which the Court clarified the findings of fact 
and refused to re-evaluate assets. Now by virtue of the law and 
premises, in accordance with the facts found and conclusions of 
law aforesaid, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That plaintiff is hereby granted a Decree of Divorce 
from defendant, and the bonds of matrimony now and heretofore 
existing between the plaintiff and defendant are hereby 
dissolved, and the parties are hereby restored to the status of 
unmarried persons, with said decree to become final on the date 
said decree is signed by the Court and entered by the Clerk in 
the Register of Actions. 
2. That plaintiff is hereby awarded the care, custody 
and control of the three minor children of the parties, to-wit: 
LINDA LEE ELLISON, DAVID ROBERT ELLISON, and ELIZABETH KATHRYN 
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ELLISON, subject to visitation rights in defendant. Said 
defendant shall have the right to take the children at the 
following times: 
(a) Every other weekend frpm Friday at 6 
p.m. until Sunday at 6 p.m. 
(b) On alternate holidays, provided that 
plaintiff shall always have the children on 
Mother's Day and defendant shal|l always have 
them on Father's Day. 
(c) For two weeks at the beginning of each 
summer and for two weeks near tihe end of each 
summer. 
(d) On Christmas afternoon from 1 p.m. 
until a reasonable hour that evening. 
Each party is enjoined and restrained from attempting to 
alienate the children from the other party and from making 
derogatory or demeaning remarks about the other party in the 
presence of the children. 
3. That plaintiff is hereby awarded, and defendant is 
hereby ordered to pay to plaintiff, the Sum of $139.00 per month 
for the support and maintenance of each of the children, for a 
total of $417.00 per month child support,. Said support shall be 
paid through the office of the Clerk of ptfeber County, Utah in two 
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equal semi-monthly installments, with one-half of the total 
payment to be made on or before the 5th day of each month and a 
like aimount to be paid on or before the 20th day of each month. 
Said support shall be subject to the provisions of Title 78-45d-
1, et seq., Utah Code Annotated. 
4. That defendant is hereby ordered to maintain medical 
and dental insurance on the children of the parties through his 
employment, and each party is hereby ordered to pay one-half of 
any such expenses which are not covered by insurance. 
5. That each party is hereby ordered to pay any debts 
he or she has incurred since the separation of the parties. 
6. That plaintiff is hereby awarded the following 
assets: 
(a) The home at 333 South 7300 East# 
Huntsville, Utah, subject to the mortgage 
thereon. Said home now stands of record in the 
names of ROBERT EUGENE ELLISON and SUZANNE WOOD 
ELLISON, and the legal description thereof is 
as follows: 
Part of Lot 2, Block 1, Plat C, Huntsville 
Survey, Weber County, Utah: Beginning at the 
Northeast corner of said Lot 2; thence South 
271.6 feet; thence North 82D421 West 117.75 
feet; thence North 41D53' West 22.0 feet; 
thence North 14 rods; thence East 8 rods to 
beginning. 
- 4-
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(b) The 1984 Subaru, subjqct to the debt 
thereon. 
(c) All of the household furniture and 
fixtures now in her possession. 
(d) Her jewelry, together with the silver 
and gold coins in her possession. 
(e) The lawnmower and snoWblower. 
(f) Her Utah State retirement. 
(g) Her personal effects. 
7. That defendant is hereby awarded the following 
(a) The household furniturte and fixtures 
now in his possession. 
(b) His diamond ring. 
(c) The Noble Affiliate stock which is 
considered by the Court to be 4 non-marital 
asset. 
(d) The gun collection. 
(e) All of his retirement benefits accrued 
through the Kraft Pension Plan,, together with 
all of those benefits accrued through the Kraft 
Thrift Plan. 
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8. That defendant is hereby awarded a lien against the 
home at 333 South 7300 East, Huntsville, Utah, in the amount of 
$22,000,00. Said lien shall be non-interest bearing and shall be 
payable by plaintiff at such time as she sells the home or at 
such time as she remarries; provided, however, that said lien 
shall be payable in any event not later than March 2, 1990. 
9. That each party is hereby ordered to pay any 
attorney's fees and court costs he or she has incurred herein. 
10. That each party is hereby ordered to execute any 
deeds, conveyances, assignments, certificates of title, or other 
documents necessary to effect the transfers set forth herein. 
DATED this JL ^  day of June, 1987. 
Ronald O. Hyde 
District Judge 
Vlahoi 
Attorney foir Defendant 
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